FUNTIMES – Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals by Anghileri, M et al.
FUNTIMES
Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals
ION GNSS+ 2018
September 24th -28th, Miami, Florida
Session B2: Future Trends of Satellite Navigation
M. Anghileri, J. J. Floch, Airbus Defenceand Space, Germany 
D. Margaria, B. Motella, ISMB, Italy
A. Garcia-Peña, O. Julien, C. Macabiau, R. Chauvat, ENAC, France 
M. Paonni, EC-JRC, Italy
Funded by the 
European Union
UNCLASSIFIED
ION GNSS+, September 24-28 2018, Miami Florida
FUNTIMES - Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals
Disclaimer
2
This presentation shows some findings of FUNTIMES -
Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals, a project
funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020
Framework Program.
(Funding Reference No. 435/PP/GRO/RCH/15/8384).
The content represents the view of the authors that prepared
it and is not related to any decision of the
European Commission or of the Galileo Programme.
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• Project Overview
• Signal User Requirements
• PNT Signal R&D Activity
• Conclusions and Perspectives
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Project Overview
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Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals - FUNTIMES
The Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals (FUNTIMES) project is a European GNSS 
mission evolution study funded by the European Commission within the Horizon 2020 Framework 
for Research and Development. 
It aimed at preliminary supporting the definition, design and implementation of the future generation of 
Galileo signals
• Considering the lessons learned from Galileo 
• Combining solutions that optimize the current system and signals with the introduction of innovation 
elements answering to the needs of the various GNSS user communities.
Duration: 24 months (January 2016 – January 2018)
Budget: €600 000
Project Coordinator: 
Marco Anghileri marco.anghileri@airbus.com
European Commission Project Manager: 
Dominic Hayes dominic.hayes@ec.europa.eu
European Commission (JRC) Technical Officer: 
Matteo Paonni matteo.paonni@ec.europa.eu
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The FUNTIMES Project Team
The FUNTIMES study was led by Airbus as prime contractor, supported by its subcontractors:
• Ecole Nationale de l‘Aviation Civile (ENAC)
• Istituto SuperioreMario Boella (ISMB)
• Airbus Defence and Space
– World leader in the space industry
– Major contributions to the design, development, implementation and verification of EGNOS and Galileo
– More than 15 years of experience in signal design and evolution in support of ESA, EC and GSA
• ENAC and ISMB from the academic/researchsectors
– Both with several years of research activities in the field of satellite navigation
– Know-how in other fields and technologies (e.g. communication)
– Background on the provision of services with higher reliability (e.g. signal and message authentication)
– Past and ongoing activities involving user communities, standardization entities and fora, service 
providers and chipset manufacturers for the definition of new signal user requirements
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Signal User Requirements Survey
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Signal User Requirements
7 GNSS user communities investigated:
• “Traditional” Safety-of-Life (Civil aviation, Rail)
• UAV/RPAS
• Automotive
• Mobile Location-Based Services (LBS)
• High Accuracy
• Timing 
• Emergency Services
User 
communities 
Safety of Life Automotive
Mobile 
LBS
High Accuracy Timing Emergency UAV/RPAS
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Questionnaire on Signal User Requirements
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Main Outcome of the User Survey (1/4) 
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• Improved resistance to RFI
– Important for most of the applications. 
– Growing threat due to increase of background noise and proliferation of unintentional / 
intentional jamming sources
➔ Desired signal features: frequency diversity, signal bandwidth, spreading modulation 
(sharp correlation function), signal power, secondary codes or ability to do long correlations.
• Ability to generate robust carrier phase measurements
– Recognized benefits for smoothing or for RTK/PPP techniques
➔ Desired signal features: pure pilot signal, signal power or longer wavelength.
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Main Outcome of the User Survey (2/4)
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• Improved TTFF (in warm or cold start) and acquisition sensitivity 
– Main reasons for this request are:
– Poor reception conditions in specific application environments
– Need for early access to some pseudoranges and for initializing other sensors
– A dedicated acquisition signal could be used to then transition to accurate tracking on a 
different signal
– Ideally not requiring significantly higher receiver resources
➔ Desired signal features: medium-length and easy-to-generate PRN codes, additional pilot 
signal, more signal power, wide correlation peak
• Robustness against multipath and NLOS situations: 
– Most applications would require more natural robustness against MP and NLOS due to the 
increasing number of users in challenging environments
➔ Desired signal features: signal bandwidth, sharp and narrow correlation function, long 
correlation durations
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Main Outcome of the User Survey (3/4)
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• Provision of an authentication service
– Feature desirable in many applications, although the short-term need is not always very clear 
as the threat awareness is not really spread.
– To strengthen the robustness of critical applications that have short time-to-alert.
– A posteriori authentication would be sufficient for a number of applications
– The main concerns of receiver manufacturers and service providers is the overhead required 
to manage safely the cryptographic keys.
➔ Desired signal features: spreading code and navigation message authentication, use of 
alternative data channels 
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• Access to Navigation message from Signal-In-Space
– All user communities still require the access to the navigation message through the satellite 
link (essentially to cover corner cases).
– There are 2 categories of needs:
– For critical applications and for users that can be in challenging environments: 
preference to have a signal that can ensure a good data demodulation of the key 
message parameters (low to medium data rate)
– For users that need high accuracy, there is a strong interest in having more 
information such as PPP or extra atmospheric information through an open channel, 
preferably aligned with L1 or L5 frequencies.
– Other desired features are:
– more frequent transmission of timing information
– reference time offsets with all GNSS including the integrity of this information
➔ Desired signal features: improved encoding scheme, fast access to CED and system time, 
higher data rate, optimized navigation message content and structure
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PNT Signals R&D Activity
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FUNTIMES R&D Work Logic
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Galileo and GPS Lessons
Learnt on Signal-In-Space
FUNTIMES Technical 
Specifications
Signal User 
Requirements
Survey
FUNTIMES 
Preliminary
Research Plan
Signal Evolution Literature
FUNTIMES 
Consolidated
Research Plan
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FUNTIMES R&D Work Logic
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FUNTIMES 
Consolidated Research Plan
Topics Investigated
• Signal Authentication Techniques
• LDPC Codes for Future GNSS Signals
• Usage of CSK for GNSS Data Delivery
• Adding New Components to a Legacy Signal
Proposed Technical Solutions
• Reed Solomon Codes for the Improvement of the I/NAV Message
• Spreading code and Navigation data based Authentication Protocol 
• Multi-Purpose TDM Signal Component
• Robust High Data Rate Signal Component
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RS Codes for Improving the I/NAV Message
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A technical solution for reducing the Time to First-Fix for non connected users was evaluated:
• Use of Reed-Solomon (RS) codes at the Link Layer (outer encoding) 
– MDS “Joker” property
– Erasure correction capability
– Error correction capability
– Systematic implementation to ensure backward 
compatibility
• Example application to the Galileo I/NAV message was assessed
– Time to CED performance in AWGN and 2-state LMS channel
– Assessment of RS algorithm complexity 
Outcomes of the assessment:
• Significant improvement of Time-to-CED (50% to 60%) especially
in urban environment
• Full backward compatibility with legacy receivers
• Low added complexity at transmitter and receiver side
CED 4/4
CED 1/4
CED 3/4
RS CED 1
RS CED 2
CED 2/4
I/NAV on E1-B
RS4
8.000 s
13.933 s
17.625 s
18.000 s
23
21
19
17
15
13
11
9
7
5
3
1
29
27
25
T0 in sec.
min. TTFFD
av. TTFFD
95% TTFFD
max. TTFFD
RS CED 3
RS CED 4
UNCLASSIFIED
ION GNSS+, September 24-28 2018, Miami Florida
FUNTIMES - Future Navigation and Timing Evolved Signals
Signal Authentication Techniques
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Objective:
Improve the PNT signal’s reliability by providing an enhanced authentication service based 
on both navigation message authentication (NMA) and spreading code authentication (SCA), in 
such a way that the two solutions can take advantage of their combination
Signal authentication design trade-offs:
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Signal Component 
Authentication schemes can be basically implemented:
▪ By modifying an existing signal component (e.g., E1-B, E1-C, E5a, E5b) 
– Possible performance degradations for non-participant users (∆𝐶/𝑁0 )
▪ Introducing a new component
– More flexibility in the design of the authentication scheme, 
thus reducing some constraints related to the backward compatibility
Impact of Single Design Aspects 
19
Signal Component
Modified 
E1-B
Modified 
E1-C
New component
Relative
Power Level
(Amplitude)
Same power as 
other open 
components
Lower power 
level 
(e.g. 1/11 or 
-10 dB)
Variable power
(i.e. amplitude 
modulation)
The choices for the Relative Power Level 
of the authentication component basically are:
▪ Same power as other open components
▪ Lower power level (e.g. 1/11)
▪ Variable power (i.e. amplitude modulation)
– Low power level options tend to increase the robustness against 
some spoofing attacks (i.e., requiring directional antennas with higher gain)
– However the power level can affect the achievable authentication performance
for participant receivers (e.g., TBA, TTA, reduced effective 𝐶/𝑁0 ) 
→ Trade-off among these aspects has to be performed
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The SNAP Solution: High-Level Concept 
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• High-level idea 
➢ Possible re-use of E1-B OS NMA data → Additional protection to OS NMA (“time binding” concept[1])
➢ Initially inspired from SSSC[2], Supersonic Codes[3], and Signature-Amortization[4] concepts
“Low rate” SCA bursts: a-posteriori verification with latency around 10 s (i.e. TBA ≈ 10 s) 
“High rate” SCA bursts: intended to reduce Time Between Authentications (e.g. TBA ≈ 2 s)
– “High rate” bursts for all satellite signals generated from same code chips, by using a future NMA key (kj+1):
crypto keym ∝ Hash { kj+1 |  GSTm}
– Different CSK shifts applied to each burst, depending on Sat. ID, previous key (kj), and next NMA bits:
shiftm ∝ Hash { Sat. ID  |  kj |  next ‘Reserved 1’ field }    
– Suitable to a 2-step verification procedure at the receiver (see next slide):
➢ 1st step based on a codeless correlation of CSKF bursts from different satellite signals
➢ 2nd step with a-posteriori verification of both CSKS and CSKF bursts (as soon as kj+1 is disclosed)
PRN CSKS PRN CSKF PRN CSKF PRN CSKF PRN CSKF PRN CSKS PRN CSKF PRN CSKF
CSKS
CSKF
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Two-steps Authentication at the Receiver 
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Being the crypto key independent of the Sat. ID, the 
bursts received from different satellites at a given epoch 
consist of the same code chips sequence, just shifted in 
a different way for every satellite. 
The receiver is able to:
1. first cross-authenticate couples of satellite signals 
by applying a codeless CSK correlation between 
bursts from two satellites, properly shifted and 
aligned → first step;
2. a-posteriori verify both ‘low rate’ and ‘high rate’ 
bursts with a correlation, as soon as 𝑘j+1 is 
disclosed → second step.
➢ crypto keym ∝ Hash { kj+1 |  GSTm}
➢ shiftm ∝ Hash { Sat. ID  |  kj |  next “Reserved 1” field }    
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Main Trade-off Aspects
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The proposed high-level concept is still open to different implementation alternatives 
and optimizations. In details, such open choices are related to:
1. Inputs for the SCA bursts generation
– Only bits from a legacy component, e.g. E1-B OS NMA bits (TESLA keys and MACs)
– only bits transmitted on a new data signal component (e.g., CSK modulated)
– an intermediate solution, using bits from OS NMA plus few additional bits from a new component
2. Signal component for the SCA bursts allocation
– on a modified version of the E1-B component
– on a modified version of the E1-C component
– on a new signal component 
3. Allocation of high rate and low rate SCA bursts
– on a single component (joint allocation)
– on multiple signal components 
4. Power level of each component carrying authentication features
– at nominal value (referred to as 0 dB)
– at -10 dB from nominal power
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Code Shift Keying (CSK) Modulation for GNSS Signals
Background
• Several problems are addressed with the implementation of a CSK modulation on the GNSS 
signal data component:
1) Amount of data which can be currently broadcasted by a GNSS signal is limited. 
This limitation is imposed by the DS-SS structure of a GNSS signal:
– increasing the chip rate increases the signal bandwidth
– decreasing the PRN code length degrades the PRN code correlation properties
2) Data component of current GNSS signals is designed as a communication signal without 
taking into account the GNSS specificities: data has different degrees of relevance for the 
receiver and variable data rates could be of high interest.
3) In urban environments, the data demodulation becomes difficult to achieve due to the harsh 
reception conditions particularly affecting the signal carrier tracking up to a PLL loss-of-lock. 
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Code Shift Keying (CSK) Modulation for GNSS Signals
Expected benefits
1) Bit rate increase of a DS-SS signal without:
– increasing the PRN code number of chips, and without increasing the signal chip rate (bandwidth 
constraint).
2) Flexibility of the data rate: 
− allows to dynamically change the number of CSK symbols.
− Different levels of robustness / timeliness can be achieved
3) Possibility of implementing a non-coherent demodulation
− More robust access to data in urban environment and/or for high dynamic users.
Possible issues and drawbacks
1) CSK signals are not suitable for ranging: the receiver does not know which cyclic shift of the 
fundamental PRN code is expected at each correlation epoch.
2) Complexity of the receiver is significantly increased: advances in receiver technologies should 
mitigate this (e.g. FT/IFT demodulator, cloud processing, improved chipset performance/efficiency)
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CSK Example Implementations Studied
25
Identifier BPSK CSK(4,1) CSK(6,1) CSK(8,1) CSK(10,1) CSK(12,1)
Modulation BPSK CSK CSK CSK CSK CSK
Number of bits per symbol 
(B)
1 4 6 8 10 12
Number of PRN codes per 
Symbol (U)
1 1 1 1 1 1
Codeword length (bits) 1200
Interleaver 40x30
Channel Code LDPC Codes
Identifier BPSK CSK(4,1) CSK(6,1) CSK(8,1) CSK(10,1) CSK(12,1)
Bit rate (bits/s) 100 400 600 800 1000 1200
Codewordlength 
(s)
12 3 2 1.5 1.2 1
Number of data 
message in 12s
1 4 6 8 10 12
DATA MODULATION
DATA COMPONENT CHARACTERISTICS
Type of Modulation BPSK CSK
Demodulation Method Coherent Coherent Non-Coherent
Decoding Method --- Classic Iterative Classic Iterative
DEMODULATOR BLOCK
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CSK Example Implementations Studied
Case 1a Time to Data 95% Value (s)
C/N0 [dBHz] 30 35 40
BPSK 36 12 12
CSK(4,1) 21 9 6
CSK(6,1) 18 6 4
CSK(8,1) 18 6 4.5
CSK(10,1) 18 6 3.6
CSK(12,1) 17 6 3
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Case 1b Time to Data 95% Value (s)
C/N0 [dBHz] 30 35 40
CSK(4,1) 18 9 6
CSK(6,1) 18 6 4
CSK(8,1) 16.5 6 3
CSK(10,1) 16.8 6 3.6
CSK(12,1) 16 5 3
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Case 2a Time to Data 95% Value (s)
C/N0 [dBHz] 30 35 40
BPSK 100 100
CSK(4,1) 100 12
CSK(6,1) 20 10
CSK(8,1) 16.5 10.5
CSK(10,1) 15.6 8.4
CSK(12,1) 12 8
Case 2b Time to Data 95% Value (s)
C/N0 [dBHz] 30 35 40
CSK(4,1) 12 6
CSK(6,1) 10 6
CSK(8,1) 9 4.5
CSK(10,1) 8.4 4.8
CSK(12,1) 8 4
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Case 3 Time to Data 95% Value (s)
C/N0 [dBHz] 30 35 40
CSK(4,1) 12 9
CSK(6,1) 10 6
CSK(8,1) 9 4.5
CSK(10,1) 8.4 4.8
CSK(12,1) 8 4
Low Dynamic User
Dynamic User
High Dynamic User
26
COMMENTS:
- Low Dynamic User: Time to Data reduced by 
2x or 4x depending on the C/N0 and CSK 
implementation
- Dynamic User: Time to Data reduced by 12x to 
25x
- High Dynamic User: Only CSK demodulation
possible, still very rapid access to data  
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Multi-Purpose TDM Signal Component
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General Objective:
• To design a signal component targeting several functionalities, e.g.:
1) Fast/Low complexity Acquisition
2) Fast access to Clock and Ephemeris Data
3) Authentication
• Allowing continuous or partial non-coherent processing
Time Division Multiplexing:
• TDM was chosen for the following reasons:
− Reduced complexity implementation at satellite payload
− higher efficiency of multiplexing
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Multi-Purpose TDM Signal Component
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Time Division Multiplexing:
• TDM considered at PRN code level: each PRN code is associated to a different 
functionality 
• TDM signal structure is defined from Short basic blocks and Advanced blocks. 
Short basic block: 
• A small number of PRN codes constitute the basic block of e.g. 20 ms:
• Each PRN code is associated to a different functionality 
• PRN codes are chosen equal to 1ms or multiples of 1ms
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Multi-Purpose TDM Signal Component
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Advanced blocks: 
• An advanced block is made of several basic blocks 
• The signal periodic structure is guaranteed by the advanced blocks.
• Example duration of an advanced block in the order of 2 to 3 seconds
• An advanced block allows for more flexibility in the combination of short basic blocks
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Multi-Purpose TDM Signal Component
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Targeted Use Cases for Signal Design
Low complexity: signal for low-power consumption (e.g. IoT devices or cheap mass-market receivers) 
High Performance – No CED: users targeting the best possible performance without putting 
constraints to the receiver complexity (e.g. autonomous cars or high sensitivity receivers). In this 
scenario it is assumed that CED is recovered either using a legacy signal or an external source. 
High Performance – CED: Same as previous but with clock and ephemeris data from the TDM signal 
component.
High Dynamic users: users with high dynamics which could require to use the non-coherent 
processing mode to ensure a high continuity or availability of the service. 
Signal design options and performance results are available in a dedicated paper:
Garcia-Pena A., Julien O., Anghileri M., Floch J.J., Paonni M., Multi-purpose TDM Component 
for Galileo E1 OS, ION GNSS+ 2018
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Conclusions and Perspectives
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Conclusions and Perspectives
32
The project allowed to: 
• study new elements in the field of GNSS signal engineering
• consolidate solutions that were already investigated in the recent literature, paving the way 
to the evolution of the Galileo signals 
The proposed ideas present different levels of maturity: 
• In some cases the solutions are ready to be implemented in the currently deployed systems
• In other cases they would require a corresponding evolution of the space and/or ground 
segments. 
The technical solutions offered have been mainly investigated focusing on the current Galileo 
Open Service signals, but can be also adopted by any other GNSS. 
For the way forward, it is recommended to support the R&D activity with early implementation and 
prototyping, especially at the user receiver side. Many of the proposed solutions are mature enough 
for this next step.
© - 2018 - European Union. All rights reserv ed. 
Thanks for your Attention
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SUR Survey Outcome per Application (1/2)
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Acq. And 
Tracking 
Sensitivity
Measurement 
quality
Additional RFI 
resistance
Authentication
Additional 
multipath 
resistance
Backward 
compatibility
Nav. message
Compl. with 
other techno.
Civil Aviation 
Navigation
Potentially 
interesting for 
surface navigation
Carrier phase 
robustness for 
carrier smoothing
No possibility of 
biased 
measurements 
(integrity)
Grow ing 
observed threat
Greater 
resistance to 
background 
noise
Desirable in the long 
term
Short TTAut (few 
sec)
Should not require 
database 
manipulation for the 
keys
Interesting for 
surface 
navigation
Mandatory. 
Legacy users 
should not suffer 
from new  signals
Access to nav. 
Message is 
essential
ARAIM ISM 
through nav. 
Message
Complete UTC 
year
INS
Train Control
Important for urban 
scenarios
Carrier phase 
robustness for 
carrier 
smoothing/RTK
No possibility of 
biased 
measurements
Important Important for long 
term.
Short TTAut (~sec)
Critical Mandatory
Legacy users 
should not suffer 
from new  signals
Access to nav. 
Message is 
essential
ARAIM ISM 
through nav. 
Message
Track data base, 
computer vision, 
visual odometry, etc.
Automotive 
LBC and VMS
very important for 
acq and tracking 
(basis for high 
availability)
early access to 
velocity information
Carrier phase 
robustness for 
carrier 
smoothing/RTK
No possibility of 
biased 
measurements
Very important 
due to 
challenging RFI 
environment
Short term against
simple spoofing 
resilience
Long term against 
intermediate 
spoofing
TTAut of a few  sec.
Important Important Access to nav. 
Message is 
important for corner 
cases
PPP info on L1 or 
L5
V2X ranging, radar, 
lidar, camera, inertial 
sensors, database, 
new  communication 
systems, A-GNSS
Mobile LBS
very important for 
acq and tracking 
(basis for high 
availability)
early access to 
initialize other 
sensors
Carrier phase 
robustness for 
carrier 
smoothing/RTK
No possibility of 
biased 
measurements 
(integrity)
Very important 
due to 
challenging RFI 
environment
Interesting to enable 
some applications, 
even if a posteriori
Depends upon 
the application
Important Access to nav. 
Message is 
important for corner 
cases
Reasonable data 
rate
Sensors inside cell 
phone, A-GNSS
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Acq. And 
Tracking 
Sensitivity
Measurement 
quality
Additional 
RFI 
resistance
Authentication
Additional 
multipath 
resistance
Backward 
compatibility
Nav. message
Compl. with 
other techno.
Surveying
At least as good 
as now
Carrier phase 
robustness in 
challenging 
environments
No possibility of 
biased 
measurements 
(integrity)
Important but 
not necessarily 
the main 
concern 
currently
A posteriori 
authentication is 
also interesting
Very 
important to 
maintain 
performance 
in challenging 
environment
Mandatory Access to nav. 
Message is very 
important
Time information 
more frequently
PPP info on L1 
and/or L5
Atmosphere 
information
INS
Timing and 
Sync.
At least same as 
now
Carrier phase 
robustness for 
carrier smoothing
No possibility of 
biased 
measurements 
(integrity)
Critical Very important
Short TTAut
Important Mandatory Mandatory
reference time 
offset to all GNSS
integrity of 
reference time 
offset
External source of 
timing
Search and 
Rescue
Important in case 
of beacon affected 
by masking
OK w ith current 
performance
Important but 
not necessarily 
the main 
concern 
currently
Already protected 
by NMA
Not critical Mandatory: 
Legacy users 
should not suffer 
from new  signals
current RLS and 
RLM answ er the 
need
possibly pass 
more information 
about the rescue 
center
Autonomous
RPAS 
Navigation
At least same as 
now
Carrier phase 
robustness for 
carrier 
smoothing/RTK
Very important 
due to 
challenging RFI 
environment
Will become key for 
traff ic monitoring 
concepts
Few  sec.
Important Mandatory no special need
maybe ARAIM 
ISM through nav. 
Message
At least INS and 
vision sensors
